The authors propose that a promotion focus involves construal of achievement goals as aspirations whose attainment brings accomplishment. Commitment to these accomplishment goals is characterized by attempts to attain the highest expected utility. In contrast, a prevention focus involves construal of achievement goals as responsibilities whose attainment brings security. Commitment to these security goals is characterized by doing what is necessary. The different nature of commitment to accomplishment goals versus security goals is predicted to influence the interactive effect of goal expectancy and goal value on goal commitment, as evident in both task performance and decision making. Four studies found that the classic positive interactive effect of expectancy and value on goal commitment increases with a promotion focus and decreases with a prevention focus.
The authors propose that a promotion focus involves construal of achievement goals as aspirations whose attainment brings accomplishment. Commitment to these accomplishment goals is characterized by attempts to attain the highest expected utility. In contrast, a prevention focus involves construal of achievement goals as responsibilities whose attainment brings security. Commitment to these security goals is characterized by doing what is necessary. The different nature of commitment to accomplishment goals versus security goals is predicted to influence the interactive effect of goal expectancy and goal value on goal commitment, as evident in both task performance and decision making. Four studies found that the classic positive interactive effect of expectancy and value on goal commitment increases with a promotion focus and decreases with a prevention focus.
What factors influence our tendency to accept goals and work toward attaining them? Evidence from different areas of psychology, including research on animal learning, goal setting, decision making, and achievement behavior, have converged to suggest that estimations of attainment value and attainment expectancy influence goal commitment. Although there is evidence that these estimations are not completely independent, especially in achievement situations (see Child, 1946; Croizer, 1979; Filer, 1952; Irwin, 1953; Teevan, Burdick, & Stoddard, 1976) , expectancy-value models of motivation have traditionally assumed that both expectancy and value are required for goal commitment and that they combine multiplicatively (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944; Tolman, 1955; Vroom, 1964 ; for a review see Feather, 1982; Mitchell, 1982) . For instance, Vroom's (1964) classic expectancy model of work motivation defines each force on behavior as the product of the likelihood that an outcome will be achieved and the valence of this outcome, the latter being determined by its instrumentality in bringing about other outcomes.
In stressing the interactive relation of expectancy and value, it is important to distinguish the independent effects that expectancy alone and value alone may exert on commitment from their interactive effect. To illustrate this distinction, consider the following equation:
Goal commitment = A(attainment value) + B(attainment expectancy) + C(value X expectancy). (1) James Shah and E. Tory Higgins, Department of Psychology, Columbia University.
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Equation 1
indicates that an increase in either attainment expectancy or attainment value produces an increase in goal commitment. But beyond these two main effects the equation also indicates that as either expectancy or value increases, the impact of the other variable on commitment increases. As value increases, for example, the effect on goal commitment of high versus low expectancy on goal commitment increases. This equation is consistent with the proposal that goal commitment is based on a motivation to maximize the product of expectancy and value (see Behling & Starke, 1973) .
Consistent with this "maximization" proposal, empirical studies have often found that estimations of goal expectancy and value have both positive main effects on goal commitment and an independent positive interactive effect. Some studies, however, have failed to find an independent positive interactive effect. For instance, although Feather (1988) reported that the interaction of perceived math ability (an expectancy variable) and perceived math valence had a positive effect on course enrollment in the sciences, Feather and O'Brien (1987) did not find that estimations of employment expectancy and employment value had an interactive effect on job seeking behavior. In examining helping behavior, Lynch and Cohen (1978) found that commitment to helping another person win a lawsuit was predicted by the expectancy of winning, the amount to be won, and the interaction of expectancy and amount. When considering whether to personally help a drowning person, however, the expectancy that the person would drown and the personal significance of the person drowning did not interact to predict behavior, although both variables did have independent main effects on helping.
These results suggest that qualitative differences in the nature of the goal might determine how estimations of attainment value and attainment expectancy affect goal commitment. Previous research has found that goals involving aspirations and goals involving responsibilities have distinct self-regulatory effects (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) . On the basis of this previous research, reviewed below, we propose that attainment value might not positively increase the effect of expectancy when the overall goal is viewed as a basic requirement or responsibility rather than as an aspiration. Specifically, we propose that the interactive effect of expectancy and value varies according to the regulatory focus involved in goal attainment; that is, whether the goal is construed as an accomplishment or aspiration versus whether it is construed as a duty or responsibility.
Regulatory Focus in Goal Attainment: Promotion and Ideals Versus Prevention and Oughts
Attainment value has long been thought to be determined by underlying needs to attain desired end-states (McClelland, 1961; Murray, 1938) . For instance, the value in attaining food is based on both cognitive conceptions of the value of food and one's underlying hunger. Research on achievement behavior has recognized the independent influence of need on perceptions of value and has sought to incorporate this variable into models of goaldirected action (see Atkinson & Raynor, 1974; Tolman, 1955) . Yet, as Feather (1990) noted, little is known about how this variable influences goal commitment.
Two fundamental self-regulatory needs that underlie goaldirected action are nurturance and security (see Bowlby, 1969) . In various forms, these drives play significant roles in many prominent theories of motivation and personality. Maslow (1955) distinguished "growth" needs from "deficit" needs. The former are described as individuals' self-actualizing needs, whereas the latter refer to individuals' physiological and safety requirements. Similarly, Murray (1938) distinguished between a need for succorance and a need to avoid humiliation. Adler (1927) proposed that much human striving originates either as a desire to strive for superiority or as compensation for feelings of insecurity. These theories share a general assumption that individuals seek both accomplishment and safety, and they suggest that pursuit of goals may serve either of these basic needs.
Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1996c; Higgins et al., 1994) proposes the existence of distinct regulatory systems that are concerned with meeting either nurturance or security needs. Selfregulation in relation to ideal self-guides that represent an individual's hopes, wishes, or aspirations satisfy nurturance needs and involve a promotion focus. Self-regulation in relation to ought self-guides that represent an individual's duties, responsibilities, or obligations satisfy security needs and involve a prevention focus. The attainment or nonattainment of ideals and oughts have been shown to have different emotional consequences (see Higgins, 1987 Higgins, , 1996a . Attaining ideals, where promotion is working, produces cheerfulness-related emotions (e.g., happiness), whereas failing to attain ideals, where promotion is not working, produces dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment). In contrast, attaining oughts, where prevention is working, produces quiescence-related emotions (e.g., relaxation), whereas failing to attain oughts, where prevention is not working, produces agitation-related emotions (e.g., nervousness).
Self-discrepancy theory proposes that individuals differ in their focus on ideals and promotion versus oughts and prevention because of different histories of caretaker-child relationships (see Higgins, 1991 Higgins, , 1996c . A history of protection and using punishment as discipline produces strong oughts and a prevention focus. In contrast, a child-parent relationship characterized by encouraging accomplishments and withdrawing love as discipline produces strong ideals and a promotion focus (see Higgins, 1996c ). Thus, a prevention focus and strong oughts versus a promotion focus and strong ideals may result from a history of safety-punishment versus accomplishment-nonreward, respectively.
Recently, Higgins et al. (1994) noted that movement toward desired end-states (safety vs. accomplishment) can be executed through strategies of either approaching matches to these endstates or avoiding mismatches to these end-states. The avoidance strategies do not simply involve inhibition or suppression but also entail commitment to action. Higgins et al. found that the promotion focus of strong ideals leads to greater approachrelated strategies for self-regulation, whereas the prevention focus of strong oughts leads to greater avoidance-related strategies (see also Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, in press ). Thus, regulatory focus can influence strategic inclinations regarding goal commitment. Commitment to ideals with a promotion focus may involve the assumption that accomplishments are best achieved by pursuing goals with the highest expected utility, goals that maximize expectancy x value. In contrast, commitment to oughts with a prevention focus may involve the assumption that safety or security is best obtained by pursuing only those goals that are relatively necessary for safety (i.e., high value goals) or that can be attained with relative assuranc e (i.e., high expectancy goals).
Thus, the interactive effect of goal expectancy and goal value on goal commitment may depend on regulatory focus. Because a promotion focus involves a desire to maximize the expectancy and value of accomplishment, the interactive effect of these two variables on goal commitment should be positive. In contrast, because a prevention focus is concerned with attaining safety or security, individuals with a prevention focus should strive to meet responsibilities seen as relatively necessary or whose attainment is relatively assured. Therefore, although Equation 1 may properly represent the influence of expectancy and value on commitment to ideals with a promotion focus, commitment to oughts with a prevention focus is best represented by Equation 2:
Goal commitment = A(attainment value) + B(attainment expectancy) -C(value x expectancy). (2) To illustrate this distinction, consider the following representations of goal commitment as a function of goal value and goal expectancy. Traditional expectancy-value models have assumed a motivation to maximize the product of these two estimations. Because the expectancy-value product is more likely to be maximized when either expectancy or value is high, the influence of either goal expectancy or goal value on goal commitment should increase with increasing levels of the other factor, as depicted in Figure 1 . This positive interaction indicates that relatively high levels of either goal expectancy or goal value would increase the impact of the other variable on goal commitment.
In contrast, commitment to duties and obligations would occur for goals that either are above some threshold of value that makes them a relative necessity or are above some threshold
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Value Low High Expectancy gardless of difficulty, whereas less important responsibilities are pursued only if their attainment is relatively assured.
These interactions, of course, indicate only relative commitment within each focus. Absolute commitment can be determined only in the context of the positive main effects of both expectancy and value information. Therefore, the overall motivating influence of expectancy and value could be more than the sum of the main effects when the goal is construed as an aspiration or accomplishment (see Equation 1 ) but less than the sum of the main effects when the goal is seen as a responsibility (see Equation 2). Higgins et al. (1997) proposed that differences in the strength of regulatory focus may be detected from the accessibility of the self-guides reflecting each type of focus--the accessibility of ideal self-guides for the promotion focus and the accessibility of ought self-guides for the prevention focus. Fazio (1986 Fazio ( , 1995 has conceptualized attitude strength in terms of attitude accessibility and has operationalized attitude accessibility through the use of response times. This operationalization follows from the assumptions that accessibility is activation potential and that stored knowledge units with higher activation potentials should produce faster responses to knowledge-related inputs (see Higgins, 1996b) . Fazio ( 1986 Fazio ( , 1995 has repeatedly demonstrated empirically the predictive power of this operationalization (see also Bassili, 1995) .
In our research with colleagues, variation in the strength of regulatory focus, as measured by self-guide accessibility, has been shown to influence the use of ideals and oughts as goals of expectancy that makes their attainment relatively assured. Because commitment would occur as long as either expectancy or value is above a threshold, relatively high levels of expectancy or value would decrease the influence of the levels of the other variable on goal commitment, as depicted in Figure 2 .
Of course, overall goal commitment depends on the absolute sensitivity to expectancy and value information. Thus, Figures  1 and 2 are not meant to indicate differences in overall goal commitment or the magnitude of the main effects for expectancy and value.
To illustrate the role of regulatory focus more fully, let us consider how the value or importance of a goal influences the impact of goal expectancy on goal commitment. As reflected in Equation 1 and the top half of Figure 1 , one should pay more attention to expectancy information for ideals of great value than for ideals of little value. That is, the effect of high versus low expectancy on goal commitment is greater when the value of the goal is high than when the value of the goal is low. Thus, high (vs. low) likelihood of reaching an ideal should be particularly motivating if one highly values the accomplishment of attaining it. In contrast, as reflected in Equation 2 and the top half of Figure 2 , important responsibilities may decrease concern with the likelihood of reaching oughts. That is, the effect of high (vs. low) expectancy on goal commitment is less when the value of the goal is high than when the value of the goal is low. The direction of this effect reflects the notion that important responsibilities are necessities that must be met re- toward which action is directed and as standards for evaluating outcomes (see Higgins et al., 1997; Shah, 1996; Shah et al., in press ). For example, Higgins et al. (1997) found that the relation between possessing actual-ideal discrepancies and experiencing dejection-related emotions was greater when individuals' ideal self-guides were stronger (i.e., had higher accessibility), and the relation between possessing actual-ought discrepancies and experiencing agitation-related emotions was greater when individuals' ought self-guides were stronger. In the present studies, then, we assumed that the strength of a promotion or a prevention focus is characterized by the time needed to respond to inquiries about one's ideal or ought self-guides, respectively. This allowed us to examine how chronic individual differences in regulatory focus influence the interactive effect of goal expectancy and goal value on goal commitment, as evident in task performance and decision making.
Study 1
Overview
Study 1 represents an initial examination of how regulatory focus influences the interactive effect of goal expectancy and goal value on task performance. Regulatory focus was measured in terms of the chronic accessibility of ideal self-guides and ought self-guides. Participants were given an anagram task with a specific performance goal. Attainment of this goal had monetary significance. Participants' estimations of their expectancy that they would reach the goal and the value of so doing were obtained and were related to their actual task performance. We predicted that a stronger promotion focus, as reflected in higher ideal accessibility, would increase the interactive effect of expectancy and value on anagram performance, whereas a stronger prevention focus, as reflected in higher ought accessibility, would decrease the interactive effect of expectancy and value.
Method Participants
One hundred four Columbia University students (57 women, 47 men) completed a two-part psychology study. They were paid a total of $10 for their participation in both parts ($5 for each part). Participants were run on IBM XT computers in groups no larger than six. All participants indicated that they had native language proficiency in English.
Materials
Strength-of-guide measure. Like the original measure (see Higgins, 1987) , the strength-of-guide measure is an idiographic measure that asks participants to list 3-5 attributes describing different self-representations from their own standpoint. Specifically, participants are asked to describe both their ideal and ought selves. Their ideal self was defined as the type of person they hope, wish, or aspire to be. Their ought self was defined as the type of person they believed they had a duty or responsibility to be. Participants were told that they would list attributes that describe both types of self-representations. Unlike in the original selves questionnaire measure, participants were told that each attribute listed had to be unique, and each was to be listed as quickly and accurately as possible. As general practice for the experimental procedure, participants were first asked to provide three actual self-attributes unrelated to either their ideal or ought selves (i.e., actual self non-matches).
Participants were then asked to list attributes that describe how they ideally would like to be now. After each attribute, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they would ideally like to possess the attribute (ideal extent rating) and the extent to which they actually possess the attribute (actual [for ideal] extent rating). Finally, participants were told to list attributes that describe how they ought to be now. After providing each of these attributes, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they ought to possess the attribute (ought extent rating) and the extent to which they actually possess the attribute (actual ]for ought] extent rating).
Self-guide strength. For each attribute listed, the computer measured three response times: (a) the time it took participants to produce the self-guide attribute after being asked, (b) the time it took to make the self-guide extent rating for that attribute, and (c) the time it took to make the actual self extent rating for that attribute. All response time measures were first transformed by means of a natural logarithmic transformation because these latency distributions were positively skewed (see Judd & McClelland, 1989) . For each self-guide attribute, we calculated a total response time by adding these three response times summed separately across each attribute.
We used the first three ideal self-attributes and the first three ought attributes produced by the participants to calculate ideal and ought selfguide strength, respectively. The first three attributes were used because output primacy is one criterion for chronic accessibility (see Higgins, 1996b) . We calculated ideal self-guide strength by averaging the total response times for the first three ideal self-attributes. We calculated ought self-guide strength by averaging the total response times for the first three ought self-attributes.
Procedure
In Part 1 of the computer study, participants completed the strengthof-guide measure. Participants were told that they had earned $5 for their participation in Part 1 and would receive this money at the end of Part 2. Participants returned for Part 2 of the computer study no earlier than 3 days after completing Part 1. All participants were then provided with a description of the anagram task that they would be completing. This task involved unscrambling a series of letters to form as many words as possible using all the letters in the series. Participants had as much time as they required to complete each of the anagrams, Participants were given three practice anagrams to familiarize themselves with the task. After completing the three practice anagrams, participants were given information concerning the purpose of the anagram task. Participants were led to believe that the computer would calculate their results and report the percentage of words found at the end of the set. Participants were told that they would receive $4 for completing this task but that if they found 90% or more of all the possible words in the set they would receive an extra $1. Before starting the set, participants were asked to indicate how good it would be if they got the extra $1, which measured subjective value. Answers were provided on a 10-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Participants then completed a set of 10 anagrams. After each anagram they were reminded of the contingency for receiving the extra $1. Participants had as much time as they required for each anagram. After finishing the set of anagrams, participants were told that they had in fact reached the standard, regardless of their actual performance. Participants were then asked to indicate their initial estimation of the likelihood that they would reach this standard after completing the practice anagrams; which measured subjective expectancy. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale that ranged from not at all to extremely. The participants were then debriefed, and the nature of the experiment was explained. All participants were paid $5 for this part regardless of their actual performance.
Anagram performance was determined by summing the total number of legitimate words found in the l0 anagrams that comprised the experi-mental set. Although participants were not aware of the number of possible solutions, all anagrams used in the experimental set had at least two solutions.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a multiple regression analysis on anagram performance that included the effects of ideal strength, ought strength, the expectancy of goal attainment, the value of goal attainment, and a variable representing the interaction of expectancy and value. The two-way interaction of expectancy and value was included in the regression, as were the interactions of ideal and ought strength with both expectancy and value and the 2 three-way interactions of expectancy, value, and either ideal strength or ought strength.
With all of the above variables included in the analysis, there was a nonsignificant positive effect of ideal strength on performance, F(1, 91) = 2.49, p = .12, and positive main effects of both expectancy and value that were in the expected direction but were nonsignificant, F(1, 91) = 2.45, p = .12, and F(1, 91) = 2.10, p = .15, respectively. Ought strength had no effect on performance, F( 1, 91 ) < 1. The interactions of expectancy with value, with ideal strength, and with ought strength were all nonsignificant (all Fs < 1 ). The interaction of value with ideal strength, however, had a significantly positive effect on performance, F( 1, 91 ) = 4.49, p < .05, and the interaction of value with ought strength had a marginally significant negative effect on performance, F(1, 91) = 3.60, p = .06.
Most relevant to our present concerns were the 2 three-way interactions. The three-way interaction of ideal strength, expectancy, and value had a significant positive effect on anagram performance, F(1, 91) = 7.44, p < .01, indicating that, as predicted, ideal strength positively influenced the interactive effect of expectancy and value on anagram performance. In contrast, the three-way interaction of ought strength, expectancy, and value had a significant negative effect on anagram performance, F( 1, 91 ) = I 1.10, p = .001, indicating that, as predicted, ought strength also influenced the interactive effect of expectancy and value on anagram performance, but in the opposite direction.
To clarify the nature of these three-way interactions, we standardized ideal and ought strength latency scores, and a new variable was created that represented the difference between these standardized latencies. We did a tertiary split of the participants according to this new variable so that we could observe the relation of the Expectancy × Value interaction to anagram performance for participants whose ideal strength was predominant and for participants whose ought strength was predominant. Separate regression analyses were done on anagram performance for each group. These regressions included goal expectancy, goal value, and the interaction of expectancy and value. The interaction of expectancy and value had a significant positive effect on performance for participants whose ideal strength was predominant, F( 1, 31 ) = 6.23, p = .02. In direct contrast, the Expectancy × Value interaction had a significant negative effect on performance for participants whose ought strength was predominant, F(1, 28) = 4.88, p < .05. These results are consistent with the proposal that the interactive effect of expectancy and value is influenced by chronic differences in regulatory focus. The interaction of expectancy and value was found to significantly affect anagram performance both for participants with a predominant promotion focus and for participants with a predominant prevention focus, but in opposite directions. Participants with a predominant promotion focus presumably viewed the anagram performance contingency as an opportunity for accomplishment. For them, high (vs. low) likelihood of accomplishment was more motivating when the value of accomplishment was high than when it was low. Participants with a predominant prevention focus, however, presumably viewed the task as a duty or obligation. For them, when this obligation was seen as a necessity (i.e., high value), how assured they were of fulfilling the obligation was less motivationally significant than when the obligation was of lesser value.
In Study 1 we examined how chronic sources of regulatory focus influence the interactive impact of expectancy and value on goal commitment. Yet if regulatory focus follows the principles of knowledge activation, it should have both chronic dispositional sources of activation potential and momentary situational sources (see Higgins, 1996b) . Indeed, momentary activation of regulatory focus has been shown to influence task performance (Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995; Shah et al., in press) . With this in mind, in Study 2 we attempted to replicate the results of Study 1 by situationally manipulating regulatory focus and again measuring individual estimations of goal expectancy and value.
Study 2
Overview
In Study 2 we manipulated regulatory focus by framing a choice situation in terms of either prevention or promotion. Student participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would take a class in their major. Participants were then asked to rate the expectancy that they would do well and the value of doing well.
Method Participants
Four hundred forty-one Columbia University students (242 men, 199 women) completed the achievement situation questionnaire as part of a general questionnaire battery. Participants were paid a total of $5 for their participation in the battery.
Materials
The achievement situation questionnaire asked participants to rate the likelihood that they would take a described course in their major. Participants were randomly assigned to either the promotion-or prevention-framed condition. Participants in the promotion-framing condition were given the following scenario:
Imagine that you intend to apply to your major's honor society and want to maximize your chances of being accepted. You have registered for a particular course in your major, and you are trying to determine whether or not to actually take the course. Your performance in this course will influence your chances of being accepted into the honor society. Your chances of being accepted are greater if you finish in the top half of the class than if you do not finish in the top half of the class.
All students with your major who took the identical course last year applied to your major's honor society. You find out the following information concerning how likely the majors were to finish in the top half of the class: 50% of the majors finished in the top half of the class.
Participants in the prevention-framing condition were given the same information, framed differently:
Imagine that you intend to apply to your major's honor society and want to minimize your chances of being rejected. You have registered for a particular course in your major, and you are trying to determine whether or not to actually take the course. Your performance in this course will influence your chances of being rejected from the honor society. Your chances of being rejected are less if you don't finish in the bottom half of the class than if you do finish in the bottom half of the class.
All students with your major who took the identical course last year applied to your major's honor society. You find out the following information concerning how likely the majors were to finish in the bottom half of the class: 50% of the majors finished in the bottom half of the class.
After reading either the promotion-or prevention-framed scenario, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would take the course on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100% in increments of 10%. Participants were then asked to rate, using the same 1 I-point scale, the likelihood that they would finish in the top half of the course. Finally, participants were asked to rate the benefit of finishing in the top half of the course, using a 5-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely.
Results and Discussion
Debriefing of the participants indicated that 41 of them (about 10%) may not have understood the presented expectancy information. These participants were dropped from the subsequent analyses. It should be noted, however, that inclusion of these participants does not significantly affect the reported results. Of most importance, the reported significant three-way interactive effect, described below, remained significant.
We performed a regression analysis on each participant's rating of the likelihood that he or she would take the course. Regulatory framing; participants' expectancy and value ratings; a variable representing the interaction of these two estimations; the two-way interaction of regulatory framing and expectancy; the two-way interaction of regulatory framing and value; and the three-way interaction of regulatory framing, expectancy, and value were all included in the regression analysis. With all variables entered, regulatory framing had a large main effect on enrollment decisions, F(1,390) = 28.77, p < .001. The direction of this framing effect indicated that participants who received the promotion framing were significantly more likely to enroll in the course than those who received the prevention framing. The main effect of value was not significant, but was in the expected positive direction, F(1,390) = 1.02, p = .31. The main effect of expectancy was significant in the expected positive direction, F(1,390) = 89.90, p < .001. The interaction of expectancy and value was not significant, F( 1, 390) < 1. The interaction of regulatory framing and value was not significant, F(1,390) = 1.02. The interaction of regulatory framing and expectancy was significant, F(1, 390) = 7.57, p < .01. The direction of this effect suggested that expectancy information was more influential with prevention framing than with promotion framing, although there were significant main effects for expectancy in both framing conditions, F(1,204) = 63.41, p < .001, and F(1, 186) = 21.64, p < .001, respectively.
Of greater interest to our present concerns, the three-way interaction of expectancy, value, and regulatory focus had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of taking the course, F(1,390) = 9.73, p < .005, reflecting the fact that the interactive effect of expectancy and value was significantly more positive with promotion framing than with prevention framing. Separate analyses of each framing condition confirmed this interpretation. The interactive effect of expectancy and value had a significantly positive relation to course enrollment with promotion framing, F(1, 186) = 7.01, p < .01, but had a significant negative relation to course enrollment with prevention framing, F(1,204) = 3.87, p = .05.
The finding of a three-way interaction among regulatory framing, expectancy, and value in Study 2 is consistent with the results of Study 1. The direction of the three-way interaction among regulatory framing, expectancy, and value indicates that the interactive effect of expectancy and value on choice is significantly more positive when the task information was framed with a promotion focus than with a prevention focus.
One issue that needs to be addressed is the generally modest main effects for expectancy and value found in both studies, except for expectancy in Study 2 that did have a large effect on task choice (perhaps because expectancy information was explicitly presented). In both of these studies, expectancy and value were not experimentally manipulated, and comparisons of performance and task choice were made between participants. Mitchell (1974) suggested that expectancy-value models of task choice are more appropriate for within-subject predictions of task choice rather than between-subject comparisons (see also Feather, 1982) . Although within-subject designs are more vulnerable to reactivity effects (see Campbell & Stanley, 1963) , such effects should be more pronounced on the main effects of expectancy and value than on their interaction. Moreover, they should not vary as a function of regulatory focus. Indeed, if reactivity increased the overall likelihood of finding an interactive effect of expectancy and value, this would work against finding the disappearance or reversal of the effect in the prevention focus condition.
Thus, a more rigorous and conservative test of the main effects of expectancy and value and the regulatory moderation of the interactive effect of expectancy and value would involve an examination of these effects for within-subject manipulations of expectancy and value. This was the purpose of Study 3.
Study 3
Overview
In Study 3 we situationally manipulated regulatory focus between participants while independently manipulating within participants the expectancy and value of taking an exam. Participants in the promotion-framing condition were given expectancy and value information framed with a promotion focus, whereas participants in the prevention-framing condition were given identical expectancy and value information framed with a prevention focus.
Method Participants
Ninety-four Columbia University students (40 men, 54 women) were paid $1 each for their participation. Participants completed a 10-min paper-and-pencil questionnaire. They were asked to. evaluate four different situations that varied only in expectancy or value and were framed with either a promotion focus or a prevention focus.
Materials
In the promotion-framing condition, participants were asked to imagine that they are applying to their first choice in graduate programs and are required to take an entrance exam that has a large impact on whether or not they are accepted. They have already taken the exam once, and their score indicates that they have about a 50% chance of being accepted.
The participants were then given information about the value of taking the exam again:
High value--Students who did better on the second exam had a 90% chance of being accepted into the program. Students who did not do better on the second exam had a 35% chance of being accepted into the program.
Low value--Students who did better on the second exam had a 55% chance of being accepted into the program. Students who did not do better on the second exam had a 35% chance of being accepted into the program.
They were then given information about the expectancy of doing better on the second exam:
High expectancy--70% of the students who retook the exam did better on the second exam.
Low expectancy--30% of the students who retook the exam did better on the second exam.
In the prevention-framing condition, participants were asked to imagine they are applying to their first choice in graduate programs and are required to take an entrance exam that has a large impact on whether or not they axe rejected. They have already taken the exam once, and their score indicates that they have about a 50% chance of being rejected.
The participants were then given information concerning the value of taking the exam a second time:
High value--Students who did NOT do the same or worse on the second exam had a 10% chance of being rejected from the program. Students who did the same or worse on the second exam had a 65% chance of being rejected from the program.
Low value--Students who did NOT do the same or worse on the second exam had a 45% chance of being rejected from the program. Students who did the same or worse on the second exam had a 65% chance of being rejected from the program.
High expectancy--30% of the students who retook the exam did the same or worse on the second exam.
Low expectancy--70% of the students who retook the exam did the same or worse on the second exam.
The expectancy information (high vs. low) and value information (high vs. low) that all participants received varied independently across four situations. The order of the four situations varied among participants. There were no significant order effects. After viewing the expectancy and value information in each situation, participants were asked to indicate, on an 11-point scale (0-100% in increments of 10% ), the likelihood that they would take the exam. Thus, each participant provided four decision scores representing the likelihood that he or she would take the exam in each of the four situations.
It should be noted that the manipulations of expectancy and value were informationally equivalent in the promotion-and prevention-framing conditions. Only the framing differed.
Results and Discussion
Because Study 3 had a within-subject manipulation of expectancy and value we conducted a regression analysis on the within-subject contrast representing the interaction of expectancy and value. This interaction score was regressed on the between-subject regulatory framing variable, the contrast representing the independent impact of value, and the contrast representing the independent impact of expectancy (see Judd & McClelland, 1989) . A variable representing the total likelihood of taking the exam across the four situations was also included as a covariate.
Contrast Representing the Impact of Value Information on Decision
We examined the impact of the value information on decisions by calculating the difference in decisions to take the second exam between situations in which the value of goal attainment was high and situations in which the value of attainment was low. For each participant, we summed the decision ratings in the situations of low value and subtracted them from the sum of the decision ratings in the high-value situations.
Contrast Representing the Impact of Expectancy Information on Decision
We examined the impact of the expectancy information on decisions by calculating the difference in decisions to take the second exam between situations in which expectancy was high and situations in which expectancy was low. Again, we summed each participant's decision ratings in the situations of low expectancy and subtracted them from the sum of the decision ratings in the high-expectancy situations.
Contrast Representing the Impact of the Interaction of Value and Expectancy on Decision
We calculated the interactive effect of value and expectancy information on decisions by subtracting the difference between high-and low-expectancy decisions when value is low, from the difference between high-and low-expectancy decisions when value is high.
Regulatory focus was found to be significantly related, positively, to total decision to take the exam and to the impact of value information, F(1, 88) = 4.58, p < .05, and F(1, 88) = 8.99, p < .01, respectively. The direction of these effects indicates that promotion framing increased the overall tendency to take the exam and the impact of value information. The effect of regulatory focus on the impact of expectancy information approached significance in the same direction, F( 1, 88) = 3.21, p < .10.
As predicted, and most relevant to our present concerns, regulatory framing was found to influence significantly the interaction of expectancy and value on decision to take the exam, F( 1, 88) = 6.42, p = .01. The direction of this effect indicated that the positive interactive effect of expectancy and value on decision was stronger when the information was framed with a promotion focus than when it was framed with a prevention focus. Separate analyses were then performed on exam decision within each framing condition. In the promotion-framing condition, expectancy and value each had significant positive effects on decision to take the exam, F(1, 53) = 70.87, p < .001, and F(1, 53) = 179.37, p < .001, respectively. In addition, the interaction of expectancy and value information had a significant positive relation to decision to take the exam, F( 1, 53) = 5.92, p = .02. In the prevention-framing condition, expectancy and value also had significant positive effects on decision to take the exam, F(1, 39) = 16.69, p < .001, and F(1, 39) = 61.15, p < .001. The interaction of expectancy and value, however, had a weak and nonsignificant negative relation to decision to take the exam, F(1, 53) < 1. These interactive effects are illustrated in Figure 3 .
The results of Study 3 are consistent with those found in Studies 1 and 2. All three studies found that regulatory focus influenced the interactive effect of expectancy and value on goal commitment as reflected in performance or decision. Furthermore, both the manipulation of expectancy and the manipulation of value in Study 3 had significant main effects on decision that were independent of regulatory focus. Study 3 failed to find a significant negative interactive effect of expectancy and value for participants in the prevention condition. Perhaps the situational framing of regulatory focus in this study was insufficiently strong, at least for the prevention focus, although framing was effective for both types of regulatory focus in Study 2. Thus, in Study 4 we again independently measured chronic Figure 3 . Contrast representing Expectancy X Value effect by regulatory focus framing. promotion focus and chronic prevention focus rather than manipulating it. We replicated the basic within-subject design of Study 3 to again provide a rigorous and conservative test of the main effects of value and expectancy and the regulatory moderation of the interactive effect of value and expectancy.
'T ! Expeetmoy x Valuta Ethlct
Study 4
Overview After we measured chronic regulatory focus, participants were asked to evaluate the likelihood that they would take a course in their major in four different scenarios. Both the value and the likelihood of doing well was varied among the four scenarios.
Method Participants
Ninety-eight Columbia University students (43 men, 55 women) were paid a total of $5 for their participation in the approximately 30-min experimental procedure. The entire procedure was again presented on IBM personal computers with the MEL computer language (Schneider, 1988) .
Materials
Computer version of the selves questionnaire ( Version 2). The new version of the computer selves questionnaire was identical to the previous version, except for two modifications. Participants were not given pracrice in responding by being asked to list unrelated actual self-attributes. Also, participants were asked to provide their ideal and ought attributes in a seemingly random order. They were first asked to list one ideal attribute, then two ought attributes, followed by another ideal attribute, a final ought attribute, and a final ideal attribute. Participants were unaware of this order beforehand. The order was randomized to control for differences in task demand between listing ideals and listing oughts that could have been present in Study 1.
Using the three ideal attributes and three ought attributes, we calculated ideal and ought self-guide strength in the same manner as described in Study 1.
Achievement situation questionnaire. The achievement situation questionnaire asked the participants to imagine that they were deciding whether to take a course in their major. Participants were asked to make this decision for four different situations that varied only in the expectancy or value information presented. In each situation participants received both expectancy and value information. Participants first received value information:
High value--Of the majors who received a grade of B or higher 95% were subsequently accepted into that major's honor society. Of the majors who received a grade below a B, 10% were subsequently accepted into that major's honor society.
Low value--Of the majors who received a grade of B or higher 51% were subsequently accepted into that major's honor society. Of the majors who received a grade below a B, 10% were subsequently accepted into that major's honor society.
They then received expectancy information:
High expectancy--75% of the majors received a grade of B or higher.
Low expectancy--25% of the majors received a grade of B or higher.
The expectancy information (high vs. low) and the value information (high vs. low) that all participants received varied independently across four situations. The order of the four situations also varied between participants. There were no significant order effects. After viewing the value and expectancy information in each situation, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood, on an 11-point scale (0-100% in increments of 10% ), that they would take the course. Thus, each participant provided four decision scores representing the likelihood that they would take the course in each of the four situations.
As in Study 3, we used within-subject contrasts to determine the impact of value information, the impact of expectancy information, and the interactive effect of expectancy and value. These contrasts were calculated in the same manner described in Study 3.
Results and Discussion
Two participants were dropped from further analysis for showing an interaction between expectancy and value that was more than 3 SD higher than the mean. The significant results remain if these participants are included in the analyses.
Ideal strength and ought strength were not significantly related to total decision to take the course, or to the impact of value information (all Fs < 1 ). The positive relation of ought strength to the impact of expectancy information approached significance, F(1, 90) = 2.92, p < .10, as did the negative relation of ideal strength to this sensitivity, F( 1, 90) = 3.35, p < .10.
As in Study 3, we conducted a regression analysis on the within-subject contrast representing the interactive effect of expectancy and value on decision to take the course. This interaction score was regressed on ideal and ought strength, the contrast representing the impact of value information, the contrast representing the impact of expectancy information, and a variable representing the total likelihood of taking the course across the four situations. As predicted, ideal strength had a significant positive relation to the Expectancy × Value contrast, F( 1, 90) = 7.89, p < .01, whereas ought strength had a significant negative relation to the Expectancy × Value contrast, F( 1, 90) = 7.08, p < .01.
To clarify the nature of these three-way interactions, ideal and ought strength scores were again standardized, and a variable representing the difference between these standardized scores was created. A tertiary split of the participants was done according to this new difference variable, creating a "predominant promotion" group and a "predominant prevention" group. Separate regression analyses on both groups examined the main effects of expectancy and value and the interaction of expectancy and value on decision to take the course. Both expectancy and value as independent variables were found to have significant positive effects on taking the course for participants with a predominant promotion focus, F( 1, 31 ) = 8.28, p < .01, and F( 1, 31 ) = 9.38, p = .005, respectively. The interaction of these variables also had a significant positive effect on taking the course, F( 1, 3 t) = 4.75, p < .05.
Expectancy and value as independent variables also had significant positive effects on taking the course for participants with a predominant prevention focus, F( 1, 31) = 12.85, p = .001, and F( 1, 31 ) = 21.33,p < .001, respectively. However, the Expectancy × Value interaction was found to have a significant negative effect on decision to take the course, F( 1, 31 ) = 5.08, p < .05. These distinct Expectancy × Value effects are illustrated in Figure 4 .
General Discussion
The present studies provide strong evidence that regulatory focus influences the interactive effect of expectancy and value information. All four studies found significant three-way interactions among regulatory focus, expectancy, and value on goal commitment as reflected in task performance and decision making. The direction of these interactions clearly indicates that the positive interactive influence of expectancy and value on goal commitment increases when the goal is construed as an accomplishment or aspiration but decreases when it is viewed as an obligation or necessity. Most intriguing, the results suggest that the direction of the interactive effect is actually negative when the goal is seen as a necessity. This negative interactive effect was significant in three of the four studies, and a meta-analysis of this effect using the Stouffer method (see Rosenthal, 1978) found a highly significant overall effect (Z = 3.29, p < .001 ). Thus, the present results suggest that a promotion focus on accomplishments strengthens commitment to maximizing expected utility, whereas a prevention focus on responsibilities and safety strengthens commitment to doing what is necessary or what can be done with assurance.
The results of previous studies in the literature can be reconsidered in light of our findings. Consider, for example, the studies mentioned earlier involving inconsistencies in the significance of Expectancy × Value interactions. Recall that a significant positive interactive effect of expectancy and value was found for Feather's (1988) study on math ability and enrollment in science courses and Lynch and Cohen's (1978) study on commitment to helping to win a lawsuit. Each of these situations could involve aspirations. In contrast, Feather and O'Brien's (1987) employment/unemployment study and Lynch and Cohen's study of commitment to helping a drowning person both failed to find a significant interaction of expectancy and value, and each of these situations is more likely to involve obligations or responsibilities.
It is also instructive to reconsider some findings of Feather and Newton (1982). They described two attempts to examine the nature of the Expectancy × Value interaction for participation in social movements. One social movement was labeled the "Movement to Promote Community Standards," and the other was called the "Campaign to Safeguard Human Rights." The expectancy that participants could make a difference and the value of doing so were found to significantly interact positively to predict commitment to the "Movement" but did not interact to predict commitment to the "Campaign." Our present results suggest that the labeling of these social movements might have produced different types of regulatory focus. That is, the "Movement to Promote" label could have produced a promotion focus, causing commitment to the movement to be based on maximizing expected utility. In contrast, the "Campaign to Safeguard" label could have produced a prevention focus that would have dampened any positive interactive effect of expectancy and value. It is also noteworthy that the distinction between promotion and prevention focus bears some resemblance to Atkinson's classic distinction between success orientation and failure avoidance, respectively (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Atkinson & Litwin, 1960) . Atkinson (1964) proposed that individuals with a predominant motivation to succeed (i.e., success oriented) choose tasks that maximize the expectancy and value of success, whereas individuals with a predominant motivation to avoid failure (i.e., failure avoidant) avoid these same tasks because they also maximize the expectancy and value of failure. By assuming that expectancy and value are inversely related, Atkinson could predict task choice from task expectancy and motivational orientation (success oriented vs. failure avoidant), as shown in Figure 5 .
Our results suggest that under conditions where expectancy is inversely related to value, a promotion focus and a prevention focus would result in patterns of task commitment similar to those proposed for success orientation and failure avoidance, respectively. Individuals with a promotion focus, like successoriented individuals, would strive to maximize the expected utility of accomplishment by choosing tasks of medium expectancy. In contrast, individuals with a prevention focus, in seeking security, would commit to tasks whose attainment was assured, regardless of value, or to tasks whose attainment was necessary for security, regardless of expectancy. The condition that maximizes Expectancy x Value, medium expectancy, is also the condition where both expectancy and value are at only an intermediate level. If this intermediate level were not seen as highly valuable (i.e., necessary), it would result in the low action tendency shown in Figure 5 for failure avoidant individuals. There could be conditions, however, where the intermediate level would be seen as necessary, and then commitment to tasks of medium expectancy should resemble commitment to easy and hard tasks. In fact, "flatter" functions of task commitment over levels of task expectancy have been reported for failure avoidant individuals (see Trope & Brickman, 1975; Wiener, 1985) . It should also be noted that although failure avoidance, in Atkinson's (1964) model, is an inhibitory motivation, a prevention focus is directed toward the attainment of security. Under conditions where value and expectancy are independent, therefore, as was most clearly the case in Studies 3 and 4, a prevention focus would cause commitment to necessary (high importance) and assuredly attainable (easy) tasks, which would produce the positive main effects for value and expectancy attained in these studies. Failure avoidance, with its inhibitory motivation, should lead to negative main effects for value and expectancy, because failure on important and easy tasks is most painful. Thus, prevention focus provides a better account of our findings than failure avoidance.
Regulatory focus also provides a better explanation of our current results than other recent models of self-regulation that distinguish between regulation in relation to positive and negative end-states. Carver and Scheier's (1990) cybernetic model of self-regulation distinguishes between regulation toward a positive or desired end-state and regulation away from a negative or undesired end-state as distinct regulatory reference points. Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) distinguished regulatory decisions made to approach a gain from those made to avoid a loss. It is possible that our manipulation of regulatory focus in Studies 2 and 3 may have also manipulated regulatory reference point. However, recent studies have suggested that regulatory focus (i.e., promotion vs. prevention) can influence the process of self-regulation even when regulatory reference points are independently manipulated (see Higgins et al., 1994) . Moreover, there is no indication that our measurements of chronic promotion and prevention focus in Study 4 differed in regulatory reference point, because all of the attributes provided were positively valenced as part of desired end-states (i.e., ideals and oughts).
The present studies explored implications of regulatory focus for sensitivity to goal value and goal expectancy for achievement goals that were established situationally. The interactive differences found in our studies may also be evident in individuals' commitment to their own chronic self-guides. If ideals and oughts are seen as the means by which one attains nurturance and security, then one may be more likely to commit to ideals that maximize the product of expectancy and value, whereas commitment to oughts may occur when either expectancy or value is high. The product of expectancy and value, therefore, should be higher for ideals than for oughts, controlling for differences in the main effects of expectancy and value. We (Shah & Higgins, 1996) found just such a difference when we measured the expectancy and value of participants' chronic ideals and oughts.
Concluding Remarks
Despite evidence that the use of expectancy and value information varies widely across individuals and situations (see Kuhl, 1982 Kuhl, , 1986 , expectancy-value theories have failed to specify the conditions that influence the interactive effect of expectancy and value on goal commitment. The present research provides strong evidence that regulatory focus is an important determinant of this interactive effect, explaining both situational and dispositional variation in terms of a basic self-regulatory principle.
